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THE ECONOMICS OF ACCIDENTS 
Michelle J. White* 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW. By Steven Shavell. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp xii, 312. $30. 
This year marks the sixteenth anniversary of the publication of 
Richard Posner's landmark Economic Analysis of Law, first published 
in 1972. It also marks the eighteenth anniversary of Guido Calabresi's 
The Cost of Accidents, published in 1970. Both books posed important 
legal questions, and then studied them using economic analysis. To-
gether, they opened up the common law to economic inquiry. But 
because both Posner and Calabresi are trained as lawyers rather than 
economists, their efforts invited economists to jump in and continue 
working on these issues using more formal economic theory. The two 
books presented a long list of interesting new questions for economists 
to work on - a happy circumstance for a field with more good prob-
lem-solvers than good problems. Calabresi and Posner in effect set the 
research agenda in law and economics from the early 1970s to the late 
1980s. 
While sixteen and eighteen aren't round numbers, they suggest the 
passage of an academic generation. Thus when Steven Shavell's new 
book, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, echoes Posner's title and 
Calabresi's subject, it immediately raises the question of what a gener-
ation of economic scholarship has accomplished in the core area of 
law and economics. Shavell's book seems to signal the end of" the 
chapter opened in the 1970s. The research that Shavell summarizes 
shows what we can learn from applying standard microeconomic the-
ory to the problems in tort law first set out by Posner and Calabresi. 
To me, it symbolizes the coming of age of the field oflaw and econom-
ics. The "new" law and economics of the common law (differentiated 
from the "old" law and economics of antitrust and regulatory issues, 
where the application of economic theory to legal issues has a much 
longer history) has now progressed to the point at which numerous 
law schools have courses in the area, and many universities offer 
courses for undergraduate and graduate economics students. For any-
one wanting to learn where we stand concerning economic analysis of 
accident law, Shavell's book provides an authoritative and fairly com-
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prehensive summary of the state of the art. Since Shavell is one of the 
key players in the "new" law and economics, much of what is summa-
rized in the book is his own prior work. But he also discusses the 
research of others, and provides a quite comprehensive bibliography. 
One especially attractive feature of the book is that it is essentially 
two textbooks in one. Each chapter, except for the introduction and 
conclusion, is divided into two parts. One part is nontechnical and 
uses examples and intuition to make the relevant points. The other 
part uses technical economic theory to make the same points, and 
works carefully through Shavell's and others' contributions on the 
same topics. Thus the book serves two extremely valuable purposes. 
First, it makes economic analysis of accident law accessible to lawyers, 
economists, and students, regardless of their mathematical sophistica-
tion. Second, it brings together much of Shavell's and others' research 
into the economics of tort law, which is scattered across professional 
journals. This should make the field accessible to anyone who wants 
to learn about it. 
In Part I of this review, I try to give the flavor of the economic 
analysis of law by summarizing some of the field's major ideas as well 
as some of the many interesting variations on the themes which 
Shavell's book contains. Both efforts should be understood to be 
highly noncomprehensive. In Part II, I consider the questions of how 
realistic are economic models of the law, and whether and when their 
conclusions can be relied on for considering changes in the law. In 
Part III, I gaze into my crystal ball and think about where the field of 
law and economics will head in the next sixteen to eighteen years. 
I. CARE INCENTIVES, ACTIVITY LEVELS AND RISK-BEARING -
THE THREE-PART FRAMEWORK" 
Economic analysis of law has focused almost exclusively on ques-
tions of economic efficiency. It has asked the positive question of 
whether legal doctrines actually lead to economically efficient results. 
It has also asked the normative question of whether alternative legal 
doctrines (borrowed from other areas of the law, or from other coun-
tries, or dreamed up by economists) would lead to more economically 
efficient results than the legal rules which are commonly used. But the 
framework within which economic efficiency questions are posed has 
broadened over the years from its early emphasis only on the differ-
ences between liability rules in the incentives each creates to take care 
to avoid accidents. Instead, a three-part efficiency inquiry has devel-
oped, focusing not only on incentives to avoid harm, but also on the 
levels of economic activity resulting under particular legal rules, and 
on whether risk is borne efficiently under particular legal rules. In the 
subsections below, I examine ideas in each of the three areas. 
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A. Care Incentives 
Economists assume that accidents occur less often and involve less 
damage when potential injurers and victims use higher levels of care. 
For example, drivers of automobiles can reduce the probability of 
causing accidents and/or the severity of accidents by driving more 
slowly. 1 Each extra mile per hour that a driver reduces her speed can 
be thought of as using one more unit of care. Higher care levels are 
costly: when a driver drives more slowly, the trip will take longer, and 
time, as we all know, is money. 
Figure 1, on the following page, reproduces Figure 2.1 in Shavell's 
text. 2 The cost of care rises at a constant rate as more care is taken. 
Expected accident losses, which equal the probability of accidents oc-
curring times accident damage, always fall as more care is taken. But 
expected losses fall quickly with increasing levels of care when care 
levels are low, and fall more slowly with increasing care when care 
levels are high.3 Total accident costs are shown in the figure by the 
dashed line, which graphs the sum of care costs plus expected accident 
losses. The economically efficient level of care is the level which leads 
to the lowest total accident costs. It is labelled x ~ Higher or lower 
levels of care than x* are economically inefficient because they result 
in higher total accident costs. This illustrates a point frequently made 
by economists. The most economically efficient level of care is almost 
never the minimum amount of care (driving at top speed) and is al-
most never the maximum amount of care (driving at a crawl). Nor-
mally, the most efficient level of care occurs at some intermediate 
point. While this point may seem obvious, it is frequently overlooked 
in legislation calling for the "best available technology" regardless of 
cost - for example, to reduce air or water pollution, or to ban abso-
lutely a product suspected of causing cancer, even if only in one labo-
ratory animal at an extremely high dose. 
What choice of care level will the driver make under different lia-
bility rules and under what conditions will it equal the economically 
efficient level of care?4 Under strict liability, the driver has an incen-
tive to use the economically efficient level of care. The basic argument 
is that the driver pays for both the cost of care and for all damages 
from accidents when they occur. Therefore she has an incentive to 
choose her care level to minimize the sum of care costs plus her ex-
1. Other aspects of care, such as paying attention while driving, refraining from drinking 
before driving, and keeping one's car in good repair, are also important. 
2. But with a few additions, discussed below. 
3. The shape of this curve, which implies diminishing effectiveness of extra care in reducing 
expected losses, reflects a frequent assumption made in economic models - one which is thought 
to represent the real world fairly accurately. For discussion of the role of assumptions in eco-
nomic models, see Part II infra. 
4. This question was the first in the "new" law and economics subject to extensive analysis by 
economists. See Shavell's discussion of the literature, pp. 20-21. 
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pected liability for damage. Since her private costs include all the 
components of total accident costs, she has an incentive to choose the 
economically efficient care level. 5 
Under the negligence rule, the driver also has an incentive to adopt 
a level of care equal to the economically efficient level of care, as long 
as the negligence standard is interpreted economically. Suppose the 
economically efficient level of care is x *. A court will judge the driver 
to be negligent if she uses less care than x*, and to be nonnegligent if 
she uses a care level of x * or more. In the figure, the dotted line is the 
driver's private cost under the negligence rule. If she uses a level of 
care below x*, she will be judged negligent and she must pay both for 
care and for damage due to accidents when they occur. But if she uses 
a level of care of x* or more, she will be judged nonnegligent when 
accidents occur, so her costs include only the cost of care. The figure 
shows a drop in the injurer's costs at x* - the "negligence notch." 
The driver will not use less care than x~ since doing so would make 
her liable for accident costs. And she will not use more care than x~ 
since extra care is costly and generates no benefit for the injurer. 
Thus, both strict liability and negligence rules give drivers incen-
tives to maintain economically efficient levels of care. So do a variety 
of other legal rules, such as negligence with the defense of contribu-
tory negligence and strict liability with contributory negligence - as 
Shaven shows. This means that there is no reason for preferring one 
of these rules over another when considering only whether the in-
jurer's care incentives are efficient. However, when other issues are 
introduced, such as encouraging efficient levels of care by accident vic-
tims, the rules have different consequences. 
Even the basic result that both the strict liability and negligence 
rules cause injurers to have incentives to take economically efficient 
levels of care is sensitive to a number of simplifying assumptions. 
These include assumptions that the injurer is always in perfect control 
of her level of care; that the injurer actually pays for damages when-
ever she is found liable for an accident; that the injurer's liability is for 
exactly the level of damages sustained by the victim (no more, no less); 
that litigation costs are zero; and, in the case of the negligence rule, 
that no errors are made by the court in judging whether the injurer is 
negligent. Shaven discusses modifications to the basic care model that 
incorporate all of these complications. 
The discussion of the effects of different liability rules when litiga-
tion is costly rather than free.is particularly interesting. Suits by vic-
tims provide the enforcement mechanism for injurers' incentives to 
take care, since if injurers are sometimes not sued by victims when 
they would be liable, their incentive to take care will be too low. If 
5. This assumes that no insurance is available and that the driver is risk-neutral. See Part II 
infra for definition and discussion. 
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litigation were free, victims would always sue when injurers were lia-
ble. But when litigation is assumed to be costly, victims sue only if the 
expected damage award exceeds the cost of litigating. Shavell shows 
that under the strict liability rule, victims may sue either too much or 
too little. The reason is that while victims' private incentives to sue 
depend on their own litigation costs relative to their expected damage 
awards, the social gain from litigation depends on whether it gives 
injurers an incentive to take precautions which are economically effi-
cient. There may be too little litigation if injurers do not take cost-
effective precautions, because victims do not sue. But there may be 
too much litigation if injurers take precautions which are not cost ef-
fective, because doing so makes victims' damages slight enough that 
they cross the boundary between suing and not suing, allowing injur-
ers to avoid liability. This means that the strict liability rule under 
costly litigation may encourage either too much or too little care by 
injurers. 
Conversely, the negligence rule potentially appears to work better 
when litigation is costly. Under a negligence rule, injurers have an 
incentive to use an economically efficient level of care because doing so 
allows them to avoid liability. Thus a negligence system in which no 
one makes mistakes does not require litigation by victims to provide 
injurers with efficient incentives to take care. In theory, no lawsuits 
should occur. Only when injurers make mistakes and are negligent 
does the rule require enforcement by victims' willingness to sue. Thus 
the negligence rule may work better than the strict liability rule in that 
victims always sue too little and never too much. Shavell discusses the 
question of whether there should be social intervention in this case to 
encourage suits by victims (pp. 262-76) - a consideration that may 
seem strange to those who have been reading in the popular press 
about the excessive propensity of Americans to litigate! 
B. Activity-Level Incentives 
The activity-level issue concerns the effect of various liability rules 
on the amount of the economic activity in question. In the context of 
our driving example, the question is under what liability rules will the 
driver choose to make the economically efficient number of trips? 
Here the strict liability rule has an advantage over the negligence rule, 
since strict liability forces the injurer to take account of whatever in-
crease in the expected number of accidents she causes by choosing to 
take one more trip. She will therefore weigh the benefits of the trip 
against its full costs. In contrast, when the negligence rule is in effect, 
the driver escapes liability for the additional accidents she causes when 
she makes an extra trip (as long as she drives slowly enough to avoid 
being found negligent). Thus, under the negligence rule, the private 
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cost of taking extra trips is too low, causing drivers to make too many 
trips. 
The solution to this dilemma, as Shavell points out, would be to 
make the level of activity a part of the court's determination of negli-
gence. 6 Thus a driver who took the economically efficient level of care 
could nonetheless be judged negligent if she took too many trips. But 
making the activity level part of the negligence determination would 
appear to present insuperable practical problems. The court would 
have to judge how many trips the driver took in a time period (which 
might be difficult if the injurer's car were used by more than one 
driver), and whether her trips were generally cost-justified. 
Shavell discusses a number of interesting extensions to the model 
of care and activity. There is a chapter on models of causation, in 
which the effects of different models on the efficient care and activity 
levels and on injurers' incentives to behave efficiently are explored (pp. 
105-26). In his model of necessary causation, whether some particular 
precaution reduces accident losses depends on which of two states of 
nature prevail (p. 106). An example discussed in the book is that of a 
town which might or might not build a seawall. The wall is effective 
in preventing flooding when a moderate storm strikes, but not when a 
severe storm strikes (p. 106). In his model of coincidental accidents, 
the probability of an accident occurring is unaffected by the injurer's 
care level (pp. 110-15). Assuming a strict liability rule to prevail, 
Shavell explores in each of these models what the effect of a narrower 
versus wider scope ofliability (such as making the town liable for flood 
damage only when the storm is moderate, or when any type of storm 
occurs) would be on the economic efficiency of injurers' behavior. He 
shows that, in general, the scope of liability has no effect on injurers' 
incentives to take care; they act efficiently in either case. However, 
activity levels may be inefficiently affected by a wider definition of the 
scope of liability. For example, if the town in the example can decide 
whether or not to take jurisdiction over the shoreline, a wider scope of 
liability might make it prefer not to take jurisdiction, but this outcome 
might be economically inefficient. 
C. Efficient Risk Bearing 
The third criterion for economic efficiency is efficient risk bearing. 
Shavell provides a lucid discussion of risk aversion and the theory of 
insurance, as the background for considering whether the various lia-
bility rules lead to incentives for economically efficient risk bearing. 
The basic idea here is that people who are risk-averse dislike facing 
6. P. 25. Shavell points out that there is an analogy to this result in the care model, when 
there are multiple facets of care, but only one is used to determine negligence. Then injurers will 
drive slowly when the driving speed determines negligence, but they may daydream while driv-
ing, since the court cannot observe this. P. 9. 
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uncertain losses. The driver faces uncertainty if she will have to use 
her wealth to compensate the victim for damage when an accident 
occurs and the victim faces uncertainty if he will have to bear his own 
accident losses when they occur. To avoid facing uncertainty, risk-
averse parties wish to buy insurance policies, which transfer the risk of 
loss from the buyer to the insurance company. They are willing to pay 
more than the expected value of their losses in return for insurance 
policies which reduce the uncertainty they face. If given a choice be-
tween full and partial coverage against losses at a price equal to the 
expected value of the losses, they will choose to buy full coverage. 
To return again to our driving example, suppose no insurance is 
available for either drivers or victims. The strict liability rule then 
places all the risk ofloss on the driver (assuming that liability is for the 
actual level of damages suffered by the victim in the accident). The 
strict liability rule in effect provides full insurance for the victim. In 
contrast, the negligence rule places all the risk of loss on the victim, as 
long as the driver is nonnegligent (i.e., uses the economically efficient 
level of care). The negligence rule thus provides full insurance for the 
driver. 
If no insurance were available, the determination of which liability 
rule would lead to economically efficient risk-bearing would depend on 
such factors as whether drivers versus victims tended as a class to be 
more risk-averse. However, in the United States, insurance is com-
monly sold by third parties - private insurance companies. Therefore 
the decision as to which liability rule is more economically efficient 
need not depend on whether injurers or victims are more risk-averse. 
Neither group needs to bear risk, since it can be transferred to third 
party insurers. 7 This means that the choice of the best liability rule 
can be made exclusively on the basis of considerations other than risk-
bearing - such as encouraging efficient levels of care and/or efficient 
activity levels. 
Shavell provides a very clear discussion of the effect of insurance 
on injurers' incentives to take care (pp. 210-15, 222-27). When risk-
averse injurers are strictly liable and cannot purchase accident insur-
ance, they tend to take too much care, since higher levels of care re-
duce expected accident liability and therefore reduce uncertainty. 
However, purchase of full insurance may cause injurers to take too 
little care if the insurance premium remains the same even if injurers 
start to drive too fast and cause more accidents. Thus, the historic 
resistance in a number of countries to allowing liability insurance for 
drivers, due to fears that the availability of insurance would lead in-
sured drivers to be careless. 
Yet a number of factors restore at least some incentive to take care. 
7. Insurers are risk-neutral rather than rise-averse. The law of large numbers makes accident 
losses very predictable when insurance companies cover many statistically independent risks. 
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First, insurance companies often offer only partial rather than full in-
surance, so that even insured drivers have to pay for part of the dam-
age they cause. Furthermore, insured persons may have their 
premiums raised in the future if they cause accidents. Insurance com-
panies also are able to obtain information concerning care levels and 
they use it to encourage insured parties to use more care. An example 
is the reduction in insurance premiums offered to drivers with acci-
dent-free driving records over a number of years. Shavell ultimately 
argues strongly that liability insurance is socially beneficial, because it 
protects risk-averse persons from uncertainty, while maintaining in-
centives for them to take care (p. 213). 
The book discusses a number of interesting extensions to this basic 
model. One of these is the possibility that potential accident victims 
might choose to insure only against the possibility of pecuniary losses, 
and not buy insurance against nonpecuniary losses such as loss of a 
family heirloom, loss of a limb, or grief due to the death of a family 
member. In this case, victims would choose to buy partial rather than 
full insurance. (The technical condition for this is that the marginal 
utility of money not be affected by the nonpecuniary loss.) If so, then 
the optimal level of compensation received by the accident victim may 
be different from the optimal level of damages paid by the injurer. But 
even though only partial compensation for victims might be efficient, it 
would still be necessary for injurers to be liable for the full amount of 
damage (pecuniary plus nonpecuniary) in order for them to have an 
incentive to take economically efficient levels of care. Shavell explores 
the possibility that a system of fines payable to the state might be used 
to supplement liability by injurers as a means of increasing their incen-
tives to take care (pp. 233-34). Fines might also be useful as a supple-
mentary system when injurers underinsure because their wealth, and 
therefore their ability to pay, is smaller than the damage they cause 
when an accident occurs. In that case the liability system alone causes 
injurers to take too little care and to engage in too much activity. 
There is also an interesting discussion of the economic effects of 
rules concerning collateral insurance benefits, such as whether or not 
insurance payments to victims are subtracted from liability judgments 
against injurers, and whether insurers have subrogation rights (pp. 
235-40). Shavell argues that the different arrangements have little eco-
nomic effect, since risk-averse victims prefer to have full coverage of 
accident losses, but no more. Depending on the rule that prevails, vic-
tims therefore will vary their purchase of insurance so that they have 
full coverage but no more. 
II. ON THE USE OF ECONOMIC MODELS OF LAW: 
A CAUTIONARY NOTE 
An ever-present problem in applying economic models to legal 
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questions is that in order to construct economic models, we must 
make simplifying assumptions. While these may enable us to reach 
clear, simple answers which are very intuitively appealing, the answers 
that economic models give us are only as good as their assumptions. 
Thus, we must always approach these answers skeptically, particularly 
if we plan to use them as arguments for possible changes in the law or 
in related institutions. When the assumptions made are reasonable, 
then the answers will also be reasonable. But there has been so little 
empirical research in law and economics that we are often in the dark 
concerning which assumptions are reasonable and which are not. 
Most economists would probably agree that the general shapes of the 
curve depicting the costs and benefits of care in Figure 18 are quite 
robust; that most individuals are risk-averse rather than risk-neutral; 
and that individuals respond to economic incentives. So the basic pre-
dictions of the care, activity level, and risk-bearing models would 
probably not generate much dispute. But some of the models dis-
cussed by Shavell involve situations in which several different sets of 
assumptions seem equally attractive. Thus, a note of caution is useful. 
To take an example, Shaven (in sections 4.3 and 4A.3) (pp. 79-83, 
93-99), analyzes the effect of courts making errors in deciding whether 
injurers are negligent on the incentives of injurers to take care. He 
argues that when courts make mistakes in determining negligence, in-
jurers have an incentive to use too much care. This example is shown 
as example 1 of Table 1 on the following page. Shaven assumes that 
there are three possible levels of care: none, moderate, and high. No 
care costs nothing and generates an accident probability of .15; moder-
ate and high levels of care cost $3 and $5, respectively, and generate 
accident probabilities of .10 and .09, respectively. Accidents, when 
they occur, always cost $100. The total cost to society if no care is 
exercised therefore equals 0 + (.15)(100), or $15; total social costs 
under moderate care and high care are $13 and $14, respectively. The 
economically efficient level of care is therefore moderate care, since it 
has the lowest sum of care costs plus expected accident costs. 
If no errors were made, courts would find injurers nonnegligent if 
they used moderate or high care, and negligent if they used no care. 
However, courts make errors in judging injurers' levels of care. In 
particular, there is assumed to be a 33% chance that the court will 
misjudge the injurer's care by one level and a 5% chance that the 
courts will misjudge care by two levels. Therefore, if injurers take no 
care, they will mistakenly escape liability .33 of the time (when courts 
judge them to have taken moderate care) plus .05 of the time (when 
courts judge them to have taken high care). In total they will be liable 
.62 of the time (1.00 - .33 - .05). Their total private costs under no 
care will therefore be (.62)(.15)(100) or $9.30. If injurers take moder-
8. See text at note 2 supra. 
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TABLE 1: INJURERS' CHOICE OF CARE LEVEL WHEN COURTS 
MAKE ERRORS 
No Moderate High 
care care care 
Example 1: (Shavell) 
Cost 0 3 5 
Accident probability .15 .10 .09 
Expected accident losses $15 $10 $9 
Total social cost $15 $13 $14 
Probability of liability .62 .33 .05 
Probability of no liability .38 .67 .95 
Total private cost $9.30 $6.30 $5.45 
Example 2: 
Probability of liability .33 .165 
Probability of no liability .67 .835 
Total private cost $6.30 $6.48 
Example 3: 
Probability of liability .41 .33 
Probability of no liability .59 .67 
Total private cost $6.15 $6.30 
ate care, they will still mistakenly be found liable .33 of the time (when 
the courts judge them to have taken no care), so their total private 
costs will be 3 + (.33)(.10)(100) or $6.30. If injurers take high care, 
they will mistakenly be found liable .05 of the time (when the courts 
judge them to have taken no care), so their total costs will be 5 + 
(.05)(.09)(100) or $5.45. Injurers choose the level of care that mini-
mizes their total private costs, which is high care. Thus, when the fact 
that courts do make mistakes is taken into account, injurers have an 
incentive to take an inefficiently high level of care.9 
But this result is sensitive to the particular assumptions made. In 
examples 2 and 3 of Table 1, the probability of accidents, the cost of 
care, and total social costs remain the same at all levels of care, but the 
court's pattern of errors is changed. In example 2, the probability of 
the injurer being held liable when she uses moderate care is still .33, 
but when she uses high care, it becomes .165 rather than .05. Total 
social costs are unchanged, as are total private costs with moderate 
care. But total private costs with high care now become $6.48. Since 
9. It is interesting to note how the model of court error relates to the analysis of the effect of 
the negligence rule as discussed in the previous section. In Figure 1, the effect of a court's error 
in determining negligence is a reduction in the private cost to the injurer of taking less care than 
is economically efficient, and an increase in the private cost to the injurer of taking the economi-
cally efficient level (or higher level) of care. These changes erode the "negligence notch" and 
may make it disappear entirely. A possible private cost curve for injurers given court error is 
shown as the line of "x's" in Figure I. As shown, it gives the injurer an incentive to use more 
care than is economically efficient, but the result could go either way. 
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total private costs are lower when moderate care is used, the injurer 
will choose moderate care. The injurer chooses to take the economi-
cally efficient level of care in the modified example, despite the errors 
made by the court. 
In example 3, the probability of the injurer being held liable re-
mains .33 when moderate care is used, but becomes .41 rather than .62 
when no care is used. The total private costs of taking no care are now 
$6.15. Since the total private costs of taking no care are lower than 
the total private costs of taking moderate care, the injurer now chooses 
to take no care. Thus the injurer now takes too little rather than too 
much care. 
Examples 2 and 3 suggest the sensitivity of the results in this model 
to the exact specification of how errors vary depending on the level of 
care. In example 2, the injurer's gain from using high care rather than 
moderate care is lower than in Shavell's example, since the probability 
of being held liable by mistake falls more slowly as the care level is 
increased. Therefore, the attractiveness to the injurer of using high 
care is reduced. In example 3, the cost of using no care rather than 
moderate care is reduced, since the injurer is found liable less fre-
quently when she uses no care than in Shavell's example. Therefore 
using no care becomes attractive to the injurer. 
Whether the care level chosen by the injurer is equal to, greater 
than, or less than the economically efficient care level depends on a 
comparison between the rate at which the probability of accidents falls 
with more care, and the rate at which the probability of the injurer not 
being held liable rises with more care, at the level of care chosen by the 
injurer. 10 If the two are equal at the care level chosen by the injurer, 
then the injurer's decision will be economically efficient. If the two are 
not equal, then the injurer has an incentive to use either too much care 
or too little care relative to the economically efficient level. 
In example 3, the probability of accidents falls from .15 to .10, or 
by 40% (evaluated at the average value), when the care level increases 
from no care to moderate care. The probability of the injurer not be-
ing held liable (equal to 1 minus the probability of liability) rises from 
.59 to .67, or by 13%, when the care level increases from no care to 
moderate care. Since the rate of decrease in the probability of acci-
dents is faster than the rate of increase in the probability of the injurer 
not being found liable, the injurer has an incentive to use too little 
10. This comparison is implied by Shavell's Expression (4.9) (p. 94), and is consistent with 
Shavell's model. However, Shavell interprets the model differently and emphasizes the condi· 
tions under which injurers have an incentive to use too much care, rather than the possibility that 
injurers might have incentives to use either too much or too little care. He shows that the injurer 
has an incentive to take too much care when the distribution of court errors is not too dispersed. 
See proposition 4.4 (pp. 95-96). Example 3, discussed here, has a dispersed distribution by 
Shavell's criterion, since the probability of the court making errors falls relatively slowly as care 
is increased. 
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care. In contrast, Shavell's example demonstrates the opposite case. 
The probability of accidents falls from .10 to .09, or by 11 %, when the 
care level increases from moderate to high. The probability of the in-
jurer not being liable rises from .67 to .95, or by 36%, when the care 
level rises from moderate to high care. Since the rate of decrease in , 
the probability of accidents is smaller than the rate of increase in the 
probability of the injurer not being found liable, the injurer has an 
incentive to use too much care. Finally, in example 2, the probability 
of accidents falls again from .10 to .09, or by 11 %, when the care level 
increases from no care to moderate care. The probability of the in-
jurer not being liable rises from .67 to .83, or by 22%, when the care 
level rises from no care to moderate care. In this case the two rates of 
change are close enough that the injurer's best care level is the same as 
the economically efficient moderate care level. 11 
What should we conclude from this exercise? Clearly, one conclu-
sion is that results of economic models should not be used as guide-
lines for policy unless one is fairly certain that the models' 
assumptions are realistic and that the models' results are not sensitive 
to small changes in assumptions. Second, we should probably con-
clude that there is a great need for empirical work - to investigate 
what model of court error better describes actual behavior and to de-
termine how quickly the cost of increasing the level of care rises. In 
the context of models of judicial error, and in a number of other con-
texts that have been explored by economists, much more empirical 
work needs to be done before we can be at all confident that we know 
the shapes of the functions that determine how the results come out. 
But what we should not conclude is that models are useless as a 
method of analysis. While some of the models discussed by Shavell 
and other economists may have their conclusions changed in the fu-
ture, anyone who reads and understand Shavell's book will be well 
prepared to understand the implications of whatever set of assump-
tions turns out to represent the real world best. The method of eco-
nomic analysis is transferable across sets of assumptions even if the 
specific models are not. 
III. WHERE Is THE FIELD OF LAW AND ECONOMICS HEADED? 
Shavell's book invites us to think about where we stand in law and 
economics and where we ought to go from here. While the book is 
entirely concerned with theory rather than empirical work, it has 
pushed economic models of accident law toward greater realism in a 
number of dimensions: by introducing the assumption that litigation 
is costly rather than free; by exploring models in which courts make 
11. Examples involving a few discrete outcomes are always inexact. If the injurer could 
change her care level continuously, she would choose exactly the economically efficient level of 
care where the two rates of change are exactly equal. 
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errors; by considering the possibility that the injurer's liability for acci-
dent damage may differ from the actual level of damage because of 
inability to pay, inability to identify the injurer, or measurement 
problems; by treating the role of insurance exhaustively, and by con-
sidering the relationship between liability rules and other methods of 
encouraging care, such as regulations and fines. 
The discussion in the previous section suggests my own highest 
concern - the need for more empirical research to determine which of 
the models used and assumptions made in law and economics are real-
istic and which are not. Future research in law and economics will 
hopefully take on more of a real-world slant, either through laboratory 
experiments measuring behavior, normal empirical work using gov-
ernment or case data, or cross-country comparisons. 
A second item for the research agenda is the need for more re-
search combining the effects of liability rules with other approaches to 
the control of risk, such as safety regulations, injunctions, fines, taxes, 
or prison terms. Having convinced us of the difficulties inherent in 
depending on the liability system to encourage efficient care in reduc-
ing accidents, Shavell devotes a final chapter to an interesting compar-
ison of the effects of the liability system versus these other approaches 
to reducing accidents (pp. 277-86). But the alternatives need to be 
viewed by economists more as supplements and less as alternatives to 
the liability system. Shavell's chapter begins this endeavor, but such a 
large subject calls for further research. 
The final item on my future research agenda in law and economics 
is that economists should widen their modelling focus to address a 
broader set of issues than they have in the past. One of the failings of 
economic analysis of accident law is economists' apparent inability to 
explain a number of recent trends, such as why the comparative negli-
gence rule and the no-fault system have become so popular and spread 
so widely in recent years, why some liability insurance markets appear 
to have failed, and why (or if) we have a "litigation explosion." To 
some extent, this failure results from economists' exclusive focus on 
normative models analyzing efficiency effects. For example, neither 
the adoption of the comparative negligence rule nor the no-fault sys-
tem can be explained by economic efficiency models. Both systems 
seem to generate higher litigation and administrative costs than the 
traditional negligence rules, and the no-fault rule leads to incentives 
for injurers to take too little care. Shavell argues, as have other econo-
mists, that the comparative negligence rule leads to the same economi-
cally efficient care incentives as other negligence rules; but this 
conclusion depends on the particular assumptions used, and in any 
case does not completely justify the rule given its higher administrative 
costs. While comparative negligence shares risk, and no-fault in-
creases compensation, Shavell points out that compensation is accom-
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plished in any case under the traditional fault system by the use of 
third-party insurance. Thus from an efficiency perspective, there 
seems to be little to recommend either the comparative negligence rule 
or the no-fault system. If economists are to be able to explain the 
adoption of either system, they are probably going to have to formu-
late models with a broader focus than just economic efficiency. 
That said, none of this should be viewed as criticism of Shavell's 
book. In fact, my only complaint is that I wish Shaven hadn't stopped 
at accident law, and had also covered the economic analysis of con-
tracts, property, and criminal law. 
